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Thinking about Morality
Sarah Sawyer on concepts and the objectivity of moral reasons
Beliefs involve, and hence depend on, concepts. The belief that stars are exploding balls of hot
gas involves the empirical concept star. The belief that nine is a square number involves the
mathematical concept square number. The belief that equality is a fundamental value involves the
moral concept equality. But what exactly is a concept? Concepts are the building-blocks of
thoughts, just as words and expressions are the building-blocks of sentences. Crucially, concepts
are acquired in the context of a shared world, and hence anchor our individual thoughts to that
shared world. The concept star, for example, is acquired initially, perhaps as a child, in the context
of someone pointing to stars in the night sky. A more theoretical understanding of stars may
develop later, but of course a theoretical understanding will develop in different ways depending on
contingent factors such as how interested one is in the subject matter, how well informed or
competent one’s teachers are, what theory is accepted at the time, and so on. A child, an ancient
Greek astronomer and a modern-day astronomer will have very different beliefs about stars, but
this doesn’t prevent them from having the very same concept. Indeed, it is because the child, the
ancient Greek and the modern-day astronomer all have the concept star that their different beliefs
all count as beliefs about stars. One implication of this view is that the grasp of a concept comes in
degrees; the more one knows about the subject matter, the better one grasps the relevant
concept.
These claims about concepts apply not only to empirical concepts, but to all concepts. Take
mathematical concepts, for example. These are acquired, in the ﬁrst instance, by learning to count
ordinary empirical objects, such as apples and pencils. In this context, mathematical concepts
apply in a relatively straightforward way to objects and events in the empirical world. More abstract
mathematical concepts—such as the concepts irrational number, √−1, pi, and so on—are acquired
by sophisticated extrapolation from the basic cases, and the relatively straightforward applicationto objects and events in the empirical world is soon lost. Again, a more abstract mathematical
understanding will develop in different ways depending on contingent factors such as how
interested one is in the subject matter, the competence of one’s teachers, the mathematical
knowledge of the time, and so on. But mathematical concepts are anchored to objective
mathematical properties and remain thus anchored even through variations in beliefs.
Mathematical concepts will naturally be grasped more fully by some than by others.
The same is true of moral concepts, which are also acquired in the ﬁrst instance by application to
examples. As a child, you acquire moral concepts by being told that you’ve acted in a kind or
selﬁsh way, that you’ve been fair or mean, that you’ve been honest or dishonest, and so on. In this
context, many of the examples are relatively clear, and the application of moral concepts to
particular cases is relatively straightforward. More abstract moral concepts—such as justice,equality, treachery, loyalty—in contrast, are acquired by consideration of more complex situations
in which the application of moral concepts is not always clear. A more abstract moral
understanding, then, will develop in different ways depending on contingent factors such as one’s
ability to empathize, the time one is willing to spend fact-ﬁnding, the time one is willing to devote to
reﬂecting on the issues, when and where one happens to live, and the moral beliefs of those in
one’s community. But it’s important not to lose sight of the fact that moral concepts are not
determined by one’s moral beliefs. A child, a campaigner for equal rights, and a member of the
anti-suffrage movement have different beliefs about equality, but the fact that they count as
disagreeing about equality depends on them all having the same concept—the concept of equality.
Moral concepts, just like empirical concepts and mathematical concepts, are acquired, at the most
fundamental level, in the context of a shared world; moral concepts concern objective moral
properties.
The objectivity of moral properties is related to the objectivity of moral reasons. Moral reasons for
acting are not contingent on our desires; they are reasons for us no matter what we happen to
want. The objectivity of moral reasons is supported by the natural thought that recognition of a
reason to act is recognition of a consideration in favour of acting—that is, recognition of some
objective value that exists independently of one’s motives. Thus in certain contexts, a child has a
reason to own up to breaking the vase, a reason not to cheat at snakes and ladders, a reason to
hand in the toy she found in the playground, a reason to share her sweets and so on, even if she
has no desire to do any of them and is not in the least bit motivated to do so. After all, owning up,
playing fairly, handing in lost property, and sharing are all, at least in certain circumstances, the
right things to do, and this provides, in those circumstances, a reason to do them.
Of course, an objective moral reason won’t by itself lead one to action; unless you recognize the
objective moral reason as a reason, you will remain unmoved. There needs to be some way in
which objective moral reasons can be understood by individual people—some way in which
people’s actions can be guided by objective moral reasons. This is why moral beliefs are
important. In contrast to empirical beliefs and mathematical beliefs, moral beliefs have motivational
force; they are essentially motivating. Thus, part of what it is to believe that one ought to recycle is
to be motivated to separate your cardboard, newspapers, tin cans, and so on from the rest of the
rubbish; part of what it is to believe that one should keep a promise is to be motivated to keep the
promises one makes; and part of what it is to think one ought to be an equal opportunity employer
is to be motivated, for example, to change policies that unfairly favour the hiring and promotion of
certain people on the basis of factors such as gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. There is
something peculiar about a person who claims to have these kinds of moral beliefs and yet shows
no inclination whatsoever to act in accordance with them. We are likely to regard the
proclamations of such a person as insincere; we are likely to regard such a person as merely
paying lip service to the views they espouse without really believing them at all. In fact, lack of
motivation in the face of moral judgement can be a form of moral ignorance—a failure to grasp the
moral concepts fully. A better understanding of the moral facts would, since moral beliefs are
essentially motivating, motivate one to do the right thing. This is because the objective moral
reasons that count as reasons in favour of doing the right thing would be ones of which, having a
better grasp of the moral concepts, you were aware.
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The view I have been articulating is a view I call ‘moral externalism’. Moral externalism embodies a
robust form of moral realism, since it presupposes that moral concepts refer to objective moral
properties. This means that if the unequal treatment of women is wrong, it is wrong independently
of what anyone believes, and independently of whether anyone either recognizes or is motivated
by its moral force. Just as in the empirical and mathematical realms, agreement does not make for
truth, and disagreement does not undermine objectivity. It’s a mistake to think, however, that the
existence of objective moral truths implies that there are exceptionless general moral principles
that can be applied blindly, without thought, in any context. The objectivity of morality is consistent
with there being no list of moral truths that one can learn ﬁrst and apply later; it is consistent with
there being no systematic procedure for determining in a given context the correct answer to a
moral question. Moral truths are difﬁcult to discern precisely because the right course of action
depends essentially on the speciﬁc details of the case. The existence of objective moral truths is
also consistent with there not being a determinate answer, one way or another, on every moral
question. Objectivity merely requires that when there is a determinate answer to a moral question,
the answer is determinate independently of our beliefs and motives.
Moral externalism explains how moral beliefs are essentially motivating; it provides a way in which
moral reasons can be both objective and action-guiding; and it is consistent with there being a
middle ground between dogmatism and relativism. The view depends, at root, on the claims I
make about concepts.
Sarah Sawyer is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sussex. This post is based onher article ‘Minds and Morals’, published in Philosophical Issues. Her research interests includethe nature of thought and language, thought and talk about abstract and non-existent objects, andknowledge of one’s own mind.
 
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
